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PROTECTION OF MORTGAGEE'S INVESTMENT WHEN TIE
SECURITY IS CONDEMNED IN NEW YORK
I.

INTRODUCTION

One holding a bond (or note) secured by a mortgage on real property plays
a dual role in law; he is a creditor as to the mortgagor-debtor, and he is the
holder of an interest' in the mortgaged land. Although obviously connected
through the security relationship of the bond and mortgage, these two Interests are ordinarily held to be based on distinct agreements. 2
When faced with a default in payment the mortgagee-creditor may either
foreclose the mortgage or sUe for a judgment on the debt as evidenced by the
bond,8 but he ordinarily may not do both at the same time.4 Should the foreclosure prove inadequate to satisfy the debt, the mortgagee can obtain a
deficiency judgment against the mortgagor 5 but if no motion for a deficiency
judgment is made, the mortgagee has "no right to recover any deficiency in any
action or proceeding." 6 To avoid this restriction to some degree) the mortgagee
may sue first on the bond, foreclosing later to recover a deficiency. This course
is subject to statutory limitations; 7 having obtained a judgment on the bond,
the mortgagee may
not foreclose until the judgment is returned wholly or par8
tially unsatisfied.
II.

WHEN THE SECURITY IS CONDEMNED

When the land embraced by the mortgage iS taken by eminent domain, the
award paid by the condemnor 9 substitutes for the land as security for the
debt,10 and the mortgage lien, formerly on the land itself, is transferred to the
1. N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 240(4).
2. See Taylor v. American Nat'l Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912), dealing with the
negotiability of a note secured by a mortgage, in which the court pointed out that the pledge
of real property securing a note is a distinct agreement not affecting the promise to pay but
simply providing a remedy for failure of performance; Thorpe v, Mindeman, 123 WIs, 149,
101 N.W. 417 (1904); 37 Am. Jut. Mortgages § 517 (1941).

3. Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1946); Dudley v. Congregation of
St. Francis, 138 N.Y, 451, 34 N.E. 281 (1893) ; see Bank of New York v. Kennedy, 183 Misc
819, 54 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1944) aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 747, 55 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st
Dep't 194S); Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 184 P. 740 (1919).
4. See N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1301; N.Y. C.P.RL. § 5236(b).
5. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1371.
6. Id. Cases holding that a similar prior statute did not negate the mortgagee's right to
sue on the bond all involve situations where no foreclosure action bad been taken, See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. 9isenrod, 263 App. Div. 227, 32 N.Y.S.2d 641 (3d Dep't
1942); Dry Dock Say. Institution v. 106-108 Ridge St. Corp., 188 Misc, 617, 66 N.Y.S.2d
761 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
7. See N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1301; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5236(b).
8. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1301.

9. N.Y. Condem. Law § 13.
10.

Chicago v. Salinger, 384 Ill. 515, 52 N.E.2d 184 (1943); Fliegel v. Manhattan Say.

Bank, 296 N.Y. 214, 72 N.E.2d 161 (1947); Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx Holding Corp., 287
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condemnation award" (hereinafter referred to as the award). The mortgagee
is entitled to participate in the award to the extent of his interest." The
rationale behind this rule is that although the mortgagee has a right to guard
his security against impairment, he is powerless to prevent the public from
taking the property by condemnation.1 3 Because his lien upon the land so
taken is destroyed, 14 the award stands in place of the land and the mortgage
is an equitable lien thereon. 1
If the mortgagee asserts his claim against the award during the condemnation proceedings,' 6 the court may direct the condemnor to pay the money into
court,1 7 pending determination of the mortgagee's right to the award.18 By
thus asserting his claim, the mortgagee can protect his rights as a secured
creditor.
If the mortgagee fails to assert his claim, the condemnor may pay the award
to the mortgagor without liability to the mortgagee,' 9 even though the latter
is, as an "owner," 20 a necessary party to the condemnation proceedings.2 1 Should
such a payment be made, it is not clear whether the mortgagee can follow
the award qua award. 22 Professor Osborne states that payment of the award
N.Y. 227, 39 N.E.2d 217 (1942) ; Bank of New York v. Kennedy, 183 Misc. 819, 54 N.Y..2d
122, (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 747, N.YS.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1945); 27
Am. Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 257 (1966); 29A CJS. Eminent Domain §§ 196, 201
(1965); 19 N.Y. jur. Eminent Domain § 136 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442, 450 (9th Cir. 1946) ; United States
v. Certain Lands in Borough of Brooklyn, 129 F.2d 577, 579 (2d Cir. 1942); Chicago v.
Salinger, 384 Il. 515, 52 N.E.2d 184 (1943); In re Dillman, 276 Mich. 252, 267 N.W. 623
(1936); Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx Holding Corp., 287 N.Y. 227, 39 N.E.2d 217 (1942); State
v. Fitzgerald, 154 Ore. 182, 58 P.2d 508 (1936).
12. N.Y. Condem. Law § 22. See, e.g., Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442 (9th Cir.
1946); United States v. Certain Lands in Town of Highlands, 49 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y.
1943); In re Dillman, 276 Mich. 252, 267 N.W. 623 (1936); Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx
Holding Corp., 287 N.Y. 227, 39 N.E.2d 217 (1942); State v. Fitzgerald, 154 Ore. 182, 58
P.2d 508 (1936).
13. See, e.g, In re DilIman, 276 Mich. 252, 267 N.W. 623 (1936).
14. See, e.g., N.Y.C, Admin. Code § B15-37.0 (1963).
15. See Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx Holding Corp., 287 N.Y. 227, 231, 39 N.X.2d 217, 218
(1942), in which Chief judge Lehman writes "[tlhe right of the holders of a mortgage to
payment of the award . . . is a right which such holders may assert upon equitable
Since the lien of the mortgage upon the land taken was destroyed when
principles ....
title vested [in the condemnor] they have been awarded a right to resort to the compensation which must be paid to the owner of the land."
16. N.Y. Condem. Law § 22.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Merriman v. City of New York, 227 N.Y. 279, 125 N.E. 500 (1919); In re Long
Island R.R., 174 Misc. 1037, 22 N.Y..2d 706 (Sup. CL 1940); In re Sea Beach Ry., 148
N.Y.S. 1080 (Sup. Ct. 1907), aff'd mem., 196 N.Y. 533, 89 N.E. 1112 (1909).
20. N.Y. Condem Law § 2.
21. N.Y. Condem Law § 4(1).
22. The following of an award as an award is not covered by statute, and case law does
not decide the point.
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to the mortgagor places the mortgagee "in the same position he would have
been in had he never bargained for and obtained security." 2 Of course, the
mortgagee still has the bond and can enforce a judgment thereon against the
mortgagor's assets, which might now include the money from the award; he
may, however, find himself involved in a costly, time-consuming and possibly
fruitless effort in so attempting to enforce the judgment because the mortgagor
24
may have spent or hidden the money.
III. TuE INTEREST RATE PROBLEM

Time, perhaps a considerable period of time, passes from commencement of
the condemnation proceedings 25 to the determination of the amount of the
award 26 and to payment of the award. 27 Award recipients are therefore entitled
to interest on the award from the date that title vests in the condemnor to
the date the final award is ready for payment 28 The mortgagee, like any other
recipient, is entitled to receive interest from the condemnor. In New York the
rate of such interest is limited by statute to four per cent where the condemnor
is a municipal corporation, 29 and it is this limitation which often gives pause
to the mortgagee-creditor deciding how best to seek redress.
It is quite likely that the bond representing the debt called for interest
payments at a rate higher than four per cent. In Security National Bank v.
Sabatelli,30 it was held that a mortgagee seeking payment out of the award
at the interest rate called for in the bond had, by resorting to the award,
"elected to substitute the obligation of the sovereign for the contractual obligation in the bond," 31 and that "[fln such case, the law is clear that the
[mortgagee] will be limited to such rate of interest as the sovereign may be
required to pay to the owner from the date of the vesting of title." 82 This
means that a mortgagee who asserts his claim at the condemnation proceedings before taking any action on the bond will be limited to the lower statutory
interest rate on the award. It does not mean that he cannot proceed in an
action on the bond to recover a deficiency should the award prove inadequate
to satisfy the debt. In Sabatelli, the award was more than large enough to
23. G. Osborne, Mortgages 334 (1951).
24. See Kaplan, Rights of Mortgagees in Condemnation Proceedings, 12 Brooklyn L. Rev.
103 (1943).

25. N.Y. Condem. Law § 4.
26. Such determination may involve a trial of issues. N.Y. Condem Law § 11.
27. The issue of who is entitled to be a recipient is one that may be tried by the condemnation court. In re Samuel Gompers Houses, 214 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
28. See, e.g., In re Stephen Wise Housing Project, 38 Misc. 2d 455, 236 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
29. N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 3-a.
30. 38 Misc. 2d 503, 236 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
31. Id. at 504, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 777 citing Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx Holding Corp., 287
N.Y. 227, 39 N.E.2d 217 (1942).
32. 38 Misc. 2d at 504, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 777 (citation omitted).
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cover the mortgagee's claim, but in Bank of New York v. Kennedy,m where

a balance of 39,700 remained due on the bond after payment of the award
to the mortgagee, the court rejected the argument that "acceptance of the
award in condemnation proceedings constituted an election, [so that the
34
mortgagee] may not proceed on the bond."

A somewhat more involved question arises when the mortgagee, instead of

going directly to the condemnation proceedings to protect his interests, first
obtains a judgment on the bond, computed on the basis of the bond interest

rate. Often, the mortgagor's lack of assets, other than the condemned property,
results in the return of an unsatisfied judgment. Can the mortgagee enforce
the judgment to its full extent at the condemnation proceeding, i.e., to the
extent of the debt principal plus the rate of interest specified in the bond?

In Muldoon v. Mid-Bronx Holding Corp.,3 5 the court, in holding the mortgagee entitled to payment out of the award at the statutory interest rate,

specifically left this question unanswered.

6

The query seems to have lain dormant until quite recently when it was

raised again in Copp v. Sands Point Marina, Inc.3 7 In this case, the defendant

corporation executed a note secured by a mortgage on land located in Nassau

County. The note called for an interest rate of five per cent, payable semiannually. At condemnation proceedings title to the land vested in the Town

of North Hempstead, and thereafter two interest payments 38 fell due and were
not paid. 39 Plaintiffs, holders of the bond and mortgage, asserted no claim

against the award at the condemnation proceedings 40 but instead sought sum-

mary judgment on the note to recover the interest arrears. 41 Summary judg-

ment was denied by special term,42 which was reversed by the appellate

33. 183 Misc. 819, 54 N.YS.2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd mem., 269 App. Div. 747, SS
N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1945).
34. 183 Misc. at 821, 54 N.Y.S.2d at 124.
35. 287 N.Y. 227, 39 N.E.2d 217 (1942).
36. Id. at 231, 39 N.E2d at 218.
37. 21 App. Div. 2d 824, 251 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 291, 217
NE.2d 654, 270 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1966).
38. The two payments totalled $5,175. 17 N.Y.2d at 293, 217 N.E.2d at 655, 270 N.Y.S.2d
at 600.
39. The non-payment of interest was admitted by defendant, who argued that from the
time title vested in the condemnor plaintiffs were entitled only to the four per cent rate
required of the condemnor. Id.
40. This fact was stressed by the appellate division when the case reached that courL
21 App. Div. 2d 824 251 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d Dep't 1964). It did not appear crucial to the
court of appeals, which reasoned that the condemnation proceedings affected only the
mortgage lien and not the debt evidenced by the note. 17 N.Y.2d 291, 294, 217 N.E.2d
654, 655, 270 N.Y.S.2d 599, 600 (1966).
41. It is unlikely that it would have made any difference had plaintiffs sought judgment
on the note in the full amount of the debt. The fact that only interest was sought may explain plaintiffs' failure to proceed against the award, since a judgment on a relatively small
sum such as this might well appear enforceable without resort to the award.
42. Unreported. Special term relied on Westchester v. P & Ml Materials Corp., 35 Misc.2d

590
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division, 43 two justices dissenting. 44 In granting the motion for summary judgment the appellate division held that if plaintiffs should later seek payment
out of the award, defendant would have a "right to a refund of the amount
equal to the difference between the statutory 4% interest rate payable in the
condemnation proceeding and the contract 5yo payable under the mortgage
note . . .45
In affirming, 46 the court of appeals held that the substitution of the award
for the security formerly provided by the mortgaged land did not deprive the
mortgagee of his right to sue on the debt as evidenced by the bond. 4 7 The

court alluded to the unanswered question in Muldoon,4 8 asking "whether ...
the holder of the note may assert his rights against the mortgagee [sic] in an
action on the note and not be circumscribed by the change of the status of the
security, ' 49 and answering that he "may sue at law thereon and, in so doing,...
recover interest at the rate specified [in the bond]."50 This answer, however,
tells us only that the mortgagee has a right to sue on the bond. It does not
tell us which interest rate will apply if he later seeks to satisfy the judgment out
of the condemnation award. Interestingly, the court of appeals made no mention of the appellate division's proviso regarding a "refund" of the difference
in interest rates if plaintiffs were to seek satisfaction out of the award. The
reason for this silence is conjectural. The high court may have felt no need
to discuss this aspect of the interest rate problem, or it may have overlooked
the difficulties raised by affirming the lower court while remaining silent on
part of that court's ruling. For whatever reason the court of appeals failed to
confront the issue, we must take a closer look at the appellate division's "refund" proviso, which because of its somewhat peculiar wording, bears more
than one practical interpretation.
For example, suppose that a mortgagee obtained a judgment on the note for
197, 225 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd mem., 17 App. Div. 2d 822, 232 N.Y.S.2d 743
(2d Dep't 1962), for the rule that plaintiffs' only remedy was to look to the condemnation
award. That case, unlike Copp, did not involve an action on the note but a mortgagce's
effort to assert his mortgage lien against the award before payment to the owner of the
land.
43. 21 App. Div. 2d 824, 251 N.Y.S.2d 516 (2d Dep't 1964),
44. The dissent was based on the proposition that the contract between the parties wos
subordinate to the exercise of the power of eminent domain and that the parties never
contemplated the contractual interest rate surviving the statutory rate. No citations are
given in support of the dissent. Id., 251 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
45. Id., 251 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
46. 17 N.Y.2d 291, 217 N.E.2d 654, 270 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1966).
47. Id. The court dismissed special term's reliance on Westchester v. P & M Materials
Corp. as erroneous.
48. 287 N.Y. at 231, 39 N.E.2d at 218. Chief Judge Lehman had said that the court weuld
not decide what would happen if the mortgagee had "chosen to enforce the obligation of the
bond in accordance with its terms and ... resorted to the award only to the extent necessary
to pay a deficiency." Id., 39 N.E.2d at 218.
49. 17 N.Y.2d at 294, 217 N.E2d at 655, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
50. Id., 217 N.E.2d at 655, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
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$106,000, representing principal of $100,000 and interest at six per cent. Assume
further that the condemnation award was for $200,000. If the mortgagor had
no assets against which to levy execution, and the judgment were returned
wholly unsatisfied, how much of the award would be paid to the mortgagee?
The answer is $104,000, representing principal of $100,000 (the extent of the
mortgagees interest in the condemned land) and interest at the rate of four
per cent. The condemnor is not obligated to the mortgagee for more than
$104,000 out of the award, and the mortgagee is thus limited to a $104,000
recovery.
But what arithmetic will be used to determine how much of the award will
be paid to a mortgagee who has partly satisfied his judgment on the bond
before looking to the award? Assume that in the example above the mortgagee
is able to satisfy the judgment to the extent of $10,000 out of the mortgagor's
assets other than the award. If he then goes to the condemnation proceedings,
will the $10,000 already collected simply be deducted from the $104,000 to
which the mortgagee would have been entitled had he proceeded against the
award in the first place? Or will the mortgagee be able to collect the entire
unsatisfied portion of his judgment out of the award? In other words, will
the mortgagee get $94,000 or $96,000 from the award?
A literal reading of the appellate division's language, that the mortgagor
would have a "right to a refund," rx would indicate that the mortgagee would receive $96,000 from the award, but would then have to refund $2,000, representing the difference in interest rates, to the mortgagor. The mortgagor would thus
be able to escape part of the obligation he assumed in executing the note, and
this at the expense of the mortgagee, who has done nothing to justify being
saddled with the loss. In view of this, a literal reading of the appellate division
holding appears inappropriate. What seems to be more likely, and certainly more
equitable, is to allow the mortgagee to collect as much of the award as he would
have received had the judgment on the bond been entirely unsatisfied, less that
amount which he was able to collect from other assets of the mortgagor. Thus,
in our hypothetical, the mortgagee would collect $96,000 out of the $104,000
"set aside" for him in the condemnation award. The result of this interpretation
is that the mortgagee receives his bargained-for-return on his investment, and
the mortgagor does not escape his obligation.
CONCLUSION

A mortgagee faced with condemnation of the land securing the mortgage
may pursue redress either by making a claim against the condemnation award
in the condemnation proceedings, later satisfying a deficiency in an action on
the bond, 52 or he may first obtain a judgment on the bond and if necessary
complete his recovery by claiming against the condemnation award.
In making his choice of remedies, the mortgagee must consider several factors, including the cost of obtaining and enforcing a judgment on the note, the
possibility of the mortgagor secreting assets should the award be paid to him
51.

21 App. Div. 2d at 824, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 516.

52. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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and the possibility of other liens on the mortgagor's assets. If the mortgage
debt is relatively small, the mortgagee may best protect himself by asserting
his claim in the condemnation proceedings. This course of action would also
be wisest where the mortgagor has no assets against which to satisfy a judgment on the note.
Where the mortgage debt is large, and consequently the interest rate is a
serious consideration, 53 the mortgagee must also consider the economic position of the mortgagor. If the mortgagor is financially healthy, with more than
enough assets other than the mortgaged property to satisfy a judgment on the
note, then a suit on the note may be the logical choice for the mortgagee.
It is where the mortgagor's assets will only partially satisfy a judgment on
the note that the mortgagee's decision becomes difficult. If those assets are
greater than the difference between the contractual and statutory interest rates,
the mortgagee has the opportunity to recover the monetary equivalent of a
fully satisfied judgment on the bond by obtaining such a judgment, executing
on the mortgagor's assets and satisfying the remaining deficiency out of the
award. (This would not hold true if a literal reading were given to the appellate
division's holding in Copp. However, as pointed out earlier, a literal interpretation makes little sense, and the court of appeals failed to discuss the issue of
a possible refund to the mortgagor.)
There is an important element of risk to the mortgagee in such a procedure,
for the judgment on the bond must be returned partially unsatisfied in time
for the mortgagee to make his claim at the condemnation proceedings. 4 The
condemnation statute5 5 sets no time limit for the filing of a claim,50 but the
mortgagee would have to assert his claim before the award is distributed"7 or
he may find that "his only recourse will be an expensive court action .. .to

recover funds, which, by that time, may have been secreted or dissipated."5 8
The prudent mortgagee will balance this risk against the diminution in his
recovery which would be caused by making his claim in the condemnation
proceeding before taking action on the bond. 9
From the foregoing discussion it is plain that the investment of a mortgagee-creditor is well-protected when the land securing his investment is threatened with condemnation. How best to take advantage of that protection is up
to the mortgagee, who may choose the plan of action best suited to the facts
of his own particular case.
53.

The seriousness of collecting only four per cent interest as against the contract rate of

interest is apparent when we realize that a mortgage may well be for millions of dollars, as

when a mortgage is given for a new office building, and the mortgagor is a corporation having
no other assets.
54. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 1301; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5236(b).
55. N.Y. Condem. Law.
56. N.Y. Condem. Law § 9; see United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 361,
362 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
57. United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 361, 362 (E..N.Y. 1942).
58. Kaplan, Rights of Mortgagees in Condemnation Proceedings, 12 Brooklyn L. Rev.
103 (1943). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 22-29 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.

